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ABSTRACT: Eliminativist metaphysicians have recently explored various argu-
ments, including those about over-determination, colocation, the problem of the 
Many and ontological parsimony, for dispensing with kinds and their token con-
tinuants. Further, David Lewis’s missing “real temporary intrinsics” has paved 
the way to treating the sortal and the modal properties yielding the persistence 
conditions of continuants as unreal because they are extrinsic. In this paper I 
show, first, that none of the arguments mentioned above are decisive against the 
disputed entities. Second, I argue that the sortal/modal properties, while extrinsic, 
are also real, because they are constitutive of kinds. The general point is that mo-
dal conceptualism should not be conflated with a cheap version of semanticism. 
The position advocated here is based on closing the gap between the metaphysical 
and the epistemic perspectives.
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1. Eliminativist Arguments
We all know what continuants are: familiar macroscopic objects, tokens 
of kinds, whether natural or artificial, with sharp boundaries. Their per-
sistence conditions are given modally, i.e., by specifying what changes 
they could and what changes they could not survive qua tokens of certain 
kinds. Continuants share a lot with the Aristotelian individual substances 
being such that if they did not exist, it would be impossible for any other 
things to exist.1 So they ground the existence of entities of other kinds, e.g. 
events, accidents, etc. From a Kantian perspective, their kind-concepts 
1 See Aristotle, Categories, 2b6–7, Metaphysics, 1019a2–4.
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help to structure experience into intelligible units. Positing continuants 
and their kinds thus seems to have many virtues. Still, the eliminativists 
like Unger, van Inwagen, Merricks find the very idea of composite con-
tinuants repugnant and eliminate them in favour of simples which are oc-
casionally arranged in certain “object-wise”.2
The eliminativist position undeniably simplifies matters of persist-
ence; while, by positing continuants with kind-properties and modal per-
sistence-conditions, there arises a host of uncomfortable questions. For 
example, there arises the question what status should be ascribed to these 
modal/sortal properties? Should we take them in a naturalist/realist sense, 
or, alternatively, should we take them to be mind- or language-dependent? 
Now this is a big issue with many ramifications. Fortunately, the dilemma 
can be addressed technically and more narrowly, due to its recent formula-
tions. These have to do with the association of the features of being “real” 
and being “intrinsic” on one hand, and being “unreal” and “extrinsic” on 
the other. To use the least committing formulation, I take a property as in-
trinsic iff a thing can have it regardless of how the rest of things are in the 
world; otherwise it is extrinsic. Notice, I do not claim that the thing with 
intrinsic property should be a conceivably lonely object in the universe; 
that would require too much of our metaphysical intuition. It suffices to 
say that a thing’s having an intrinsic property does not depend on other 
things.3
The recent dispute about inrinsicness/extrinsicness has been fuelled 
mainly by disputes about persistence and real change; consequently, its 
main concern has been with property attributions relative to times.4 David 
Lewis was the first missing “real temporary intrinsics” with the attribution 
of contingent properties to things in the endurantist frame. Since contin-
gent properties are had by things only at certain times, therefore their at-
tributions are typically relativized to times. But then the intrinsic feature 
of the properties taken simpliciter are lost, so is Lewis’s complaint. E.g. 
shapes are intrinsic properties; but whenever an object changes its shape, 
its time-relative attribution turns it to an extrinsic property. Thereby an 
association is established between features being intrinsic, hence real, and 
extrinsic, hence unreal.
Lewis‘s argument is an unusual application of the standard notion of 
extrinsicness. For, “times” are not ordinary things on a par with those things 
whose involvement in the property attributions typically make properties 
2 See Unger (1979), van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001).
3 The “having” of a property should not be taken in a relational sense, otherwise 
Bradleys regress ensues. See Lewis (2002). 
4 Without a full coverage of the topic, see: Lewis (1986a), (2002), Haslanger (1989), 
Zimmerman (2006). 
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extrinsic. As is known from Kant, “Time” is not a “thing”, at least not in 
the sense of being one of the ordinary things we encounter in experience. 
Rather, the case is that ordinary things must conform to the conditions 
of the spatio-temporal framework in order to become objects of possible 
experience. The use of the noun-phrase “Time” is misleading here, since 
the involvement of time(s) in the attribution of contingent properties is not 
involvement in the local sense. I shall explore this point later.
Now provided that the temporal/modal analogy holds, the dispute 
about intrinsicness/extrinsicness illuminated by the temporal case has a 
bearing on the status of the modal/sortal properties as well. For example, 
M. Rea thinks that the modal/sortal properties are all extrinsic, because 
“what a thing can and cannot survive depends on what kind of thing it is” 
and vice versa.5 In Rea’s view conceptualism or conventionalism “leads 
to anti-realism” about material objects. But what is more pertinent to the 
present concern is that conceptualism also puts modal/sortal properties 
into a special perspective since these properties become relativized to the 
conceptual frameworks adopted and certain modes of presentation. This, 
however, seems to deprive these properties from the status of yielding the 
real nature of things.
I do two things here. First, I survey the main eliminativist arguments 
against continuants and their kinds and show that none of them is conclu-
sive. Second, I show that these options opened for modal/sortal/temporal-
ized properties to be either intrinsic and real or extrinsic and unreal are 
horns of a bad dilemma. My claim is that properties of the disputed classes 
are both extrinsic and real. Extrinsicality is not something we’d better 
avoid; when we select the modal profile of an object relative to a sortal, or 
some other mode of specification, we do not lose hold on reality. Modal 
conceptualism is not cheap conventionalism; Carnap’s initiatives may be 
elaborated on a bit differently, as I shall argue.
For ease of discussion I ignore here other applications of the intrinsic/
extrinsic distinction such as its application in supervenience claims about 
putative intrinsic duplicates, or the special tailoring of the distinction to 
the needs of the counterpart theory. It is worth reminding that intrinsic 
properties are typically non-relational. For example, “unreal” Cambridge 
changes are often characterized as involving changes merely in the re-
lational properties of things/persons, while “real” changes always con-
cern intrinsic properties.6 Also, intrinsicness is claimed to be the feature 
of qualitative properties, while features like spatio-temporal positions are 
clearly non-qualitative and extrinsic.
5 Rea (2002), 95, quoted also by Thomasson (2007), 64–65.
6 See Ujvári (2004).
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2. The Untenability of Eliminativism
The main eliminativist arguments to be glossed briefly are: 1. the argu-
ment from ontological parsimony; 2. the argument from the problem of 
the Many; 3. the argument from colocation; 4. the argument from over-
determination. Each of these arguments purports to support the claim that 
continuants and their kinds are dispensable in the metaphysical domain. 
While relying on standard criticisms of these arguments from A. L. Tho-
masson (2007), K. Bennett (2009) and K. Hawley (2008), I add my own 
perspective. I take it that the success of 1 depends on the success of the 
other arguments since one can be eliminative with respect to certain enti-
ties only if one is not thereby unduly eliminative with respect to genuine 
metaphysical problems; but this depends on the rest of the arguments. As 
to 2, I shall show that it is a reduction argument for, and not against, the 
continuants. Concerning 3 I’ll say that its nominalist solution earning ac-
ceptance nowadays is in perfect match with modal conceptualism that I 
support. Argument 4 about overdetermination can be successfully met, as 
follows.
According to 4 our explanation of a single case causation is overde-
termined if we take a composite continuant object as causally responsible 
for an effect, on top of the causal efficiency of its simples arranged in ob-
ject-wise in the particular mode of the object. Say, we refer to a “football” 
as casually responsible for the breaking of the window. According to the 
eliminativist, this is a redundancy, since there is nothing, over and above 
the concert of the simples-arranged-in-footballwise, which is casually rel-
evant. The source of the argument is J. Kim’s principle of explanatory 
exclusion set against dualism in philosophy of mind. Now, undoubt-
edly, the main or unique cause of an event has to be isolated in a singular 
casual explanation excluding also thereby the causal efficiency of other 
independent factors. But the point is that the football and the simples-ar-
ranged-in-footballwise are not two independent causal candidates. There 
is an analytic connection, as Thomasson points it out, between the “foot-
ball” and the “simples-arranged-in-footballwise”, since the latter depends 
referentially on the former. The expression “simples-arranged-in-object-
wise” contains essential reference to the “object” specified by some sortal. 
Overdetermination would apply only if the candidates for the causal role 
were independent; but since they are not, 4 is flawed.
There is also a metaphysical rejoinder to 4 devised by Bennett. It 
says that rivalry obtains not only between the objects and the simples-
arranged-in-objectwise. Also, there is the rivalry of several different but 
sufficiently overlapping sets of simples-arranged-in-objectwise, which 
can perform the same causal role. Say, there are slightly different sets of 
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simples making up the football, their difference being due to the vague-
ness of constitution. After all, the very same football could be constituted 
materially with some more or with some less leather particles. So, if there 
is overdetermination in singular causal explanation it applies to the elimi-
nativist’s account as well.
One could object that while Bennett successfully copes with over-
determination by invoking the vagueness of constitution, she generates 
thereby the problem of the Many, another argument in the eliminativist’s 
arsenal. But, remember, my claim was that the problem of the Many is a 
reductio proof for continuants. The main thrust of the argument with the 
Many, as I take it, is that instantiation of a kind in a concrete composite 
object can not to be tied to any one of the possible mereological sums of 
the bodily parts of the object because composition is vague. A given rabbit 
would be the same instance of rabbithood even if it lost one more hair or 
one tooth of it grew a bit longer. There is variance in mereological realiza-
tion but just one single kind-instantiation takes place, since kind-instan-
tiation is compatible with the abundance of mereological possibilities. In 
other words, kind-instantiation does not supervene on any of the possible 
mereological sums of the bodily parts making up a given continuant.
For the eliminativist, however, the story runs like this: whenever there 
is an F composite thing present, then, simultaneously, there are count-
less many sufficiently overlapping F-things present, each of which claims 
identity with the F-thing which is clearly uncomfortable. No such problem 
arises if concrete things are not taken as instances of kinds. No kinds, no 
problem of the Many.7
Unconvinced by this reasoning I do think that kind-concepts govern 
our regimentation of things, both epistemologically and metaphysically, 
and, as a consequence, the argument of the Many is a reductio support 
for the claim that kind-instantiation is not to be identified with the literal 
exposition of all the mereological possibilities. The reason being, simply, 
that kind-instantiation does not supervene on mereological realization. 
And the vagueness of constitution sufficiently explains why the instan-
tiation of a kind is compatible with the abundance of mereological pos-
sibilities. So, I think that Bennett’s argument against overdetermination is 
sound and is consistent with my reading of the problem of Many.
Let us turn now to 3 about colocation, and more specifically, to its 
nominalist treatment. As is familiar, objectors to colocation argue that by 
postulating kinds the very “same” object would count as several but colo-
cated qua-objects, which is unintuitive, once the same spatio-temporal 
7 About the problem of the Many see: Geach (1980), Unger (1980), Lewis (1993), 
Sattig (2010).
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region is occupied (spatial version: Wiggins 1968, mereological version: 
Merricks 2001). Merricks, Zimmerman, Heller, Lewis, Noonan, Inwagen, 
Burke, etc. refuse colocation. Objectors to colocation deny sortal prop-
erties since they are not yielded with material constitution. The dispute 
often takes the form whether constitution is, or is not, identity.8 Wiggins 
and Simons, for example, maintain that colocation obtains only as a rela-
tion between a sortal and its material constitutor. Objectors to colocation 
also warn us that truth claims involving the application of sortal/modal 
properties would be truth-claims without truth-making facts. Now undeni-
ably “truth-without-truth-makers” sounds quite anti-realistically requiring 
explanation.
A popular mode to evade the problem is to embrace a nominalist so-
lution to 3. It consists in taking modal predicates in a context-dependent 
way. More specifically, the nominalist claims that modal predicates ex-
press different properties depending on the mode of presentation of the 
subject the predicate is applied to in the propositional context. For exam-
ple, if “Lump” is the subject term, then “squeezable” expresses a property 
not violating the persistence conditions of the subject under the selected 
subject term. However, if “Goliath”, the statue made of a lump of clay, 
is the subject term, “squeezable” expresses a property that does violate 
persistence-conditions of the subject under the selected subject term. On 
the basis of Abelard’s writings, Harold Noonan has coined the term “Abe-
lardian predicates” for such cases of modal attribution.9 The virtue of this 
solution is that the nominalist need not posit colocated objects in order to 
explain certain cases of non-substitutivity in modal contexts. Instead, he 
can claim that difference in the modes of presentation of the subject in-
vites different modal properties expressed by the same modal predicate.
While being sympathetic to this nominalist move, one might still feel 
uncomfortable about its standard exposition. After all, a modal predicate 
like “squeezable” has a fixed generic meaning common to all its possible 
cases; its intension or sense does not vary with the particular modes of 
presentation of the subject terms. The differences, one thinks, are due to 
differences in the application conditions of the same property rather than 
to differences brought forth by the expressive power of modal predicates. 
What will be then distinctively special about modal predicates? Well, 
on a charitable reading the nominalist need not deny the generic mean-
ing of modal predicates. Simply, he can point out that from a nominalist 
perspective properties are determined by their extensions, actual and/or 
counterfactual. Now a modal property is determined, on the nominalist-
8 See Noonan (1993), Johnston (1992), Fine (2003).
9 See Noonan (1991). The same position is spelled out in his recent paper (2008).
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Abelardian view, on the extension of quasi-intensional objects, i.e. ob-
jects-under-some-mode-of-presentation. “Squeezable”, interpreted on the 
extension of things qua artefacts, yields a persistence-violating property, 
while interpreted on the extension of things qua material stuffs it yields a 
persistence-preserving property. Thus the nominalist solution to coloca-
tion is shown to be exempt from the charge of ignoring the generic mean-
ing of predicates.
As we have seen, none of the objections to kinds and continuants sur-
veyed here has proved to be decisive. Now we are permitted to talk about 
continuant-kinds and tokens once the obstacle has been removed.
3. Modal/Sortal Properties’ being both Real and Extrinsic
An objector may grant us the license to such talk while indicating the price 
of the nominalist solution. He can argue, for example, that we cannot but 
downgrade modal properties by taking them to be extrinsic features rela-
tivized to modes-of-presentations of the subjects of predication rather than 
taking them to be genuine, real intrinsic features. Now we are back to the 
familiar dilemma set forth at the beginning: are modal/sortal properties 
intrinsic, hence real, or, extrinsic, hence unreal? If modal/sortal proper-
ties depend on the modes-of-presentations of things, they do not seem to 
constitute the real, intrinsic natures of things. They yield only extrinsic 
properties relative to our conventions, so is the claim. Since we negotiate 
them into the things, the question of persistence seems to be a matter of 
our semantic decisions.
Do we have to buy into this reading? I argue that we do not have 
to; the disputed properties can be shown to be both real and extrinsic. 
To remind, extrinsic properties are those whose attribution requires the 
involvement of, or, the reference to, things other than the subject of predi-
cation. Eo ipso, no properties of lonely objects could be extrinsic. This is 
not to say, of course, that extrinsic properties have an explicit relational 
structure. To be a roof, or to be a grocer, for example, would qualify as 
extrinsic properties according to this criterion. The other things involved 
in the attribution of such properties are on a par with the subject of at-
tribution: other artefacts, persons, and plums, etc. That is, extrinsicness 
involves further things on the local level, comparable with the status and 
level of the subject of attribution. But in Lewis’s argument about tem-
porary intrinsics, the very fact that reference must be made to “time” is 
supposed to turn properties, otherwise intrinsic when taken simpliciter, 
into extrinsic and hence unreal. “Shape” is intrinsic but the bent shape 
of Socrates sitting only for a while would turn this determinate property 
extrinsic.
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The mistake in Lewis’s argument is that “time” is not an entity on 
a par with ordinary things whose involvement makes certain properties 
extrinsic. Time is an Un-Ding, as Kant has already explained; our “ob-
jectual” colloquial style misleads us here: time, just like space, are not 
“what”-s, but they are short for a metaphysical condition for being an 
object of possible experience. It is part and parcel of the notion of being 
an object of possible experience that the object conforms to the conditions 
of spatio-temporality, plus further conditions about being regimented in a 
conceptual framework, etc. Consequently, the involvement, in property-
attributions, of these condition-implying special entities belonging to the 
global metaphysical level does not turn the properties in question “extrin-
sic” and “unreal”.
Lewis’s argument has been criticised on various grounds. But no one 
has exposed his/her objection along the lines sketched here. Suppose it 
is granted, with Lewis, that reference to an overall condition like tempo-
rality, does make a difference to the status of the attributed property by 
making it extrinsic. Then the same must hold to all the other overall condi-
tions of knowledge and property-attribution. Thus we get a special class of 
extrinsic properties which count “extrinsic” only on a charitable reading. 
Whether they are covertly “intrinsic” or weakly “extrinsic”, these proper-
ties are constitutive of things as subjects of attribution; hence they have a 
full entitlement to being real features. I have in mind properties like “being 
an object of possible experience”, “being an object of a certain kind”, “be-
ing the subject of predication under-a-certain-mode-of-presentation”, etc. 
These require reference to general framework conditions of experience, 
knowledge, and language. Hence, they should not be treated as ordinary 
relational properties in the local sense, not constituting the real nature of 
their relata. These special extrinsic properties are constitutive of the real 
nature of things. In this sense they are nearly “intrinsic”, or, alternatively, 
“extrinsic” in a weak and special sense. Putting aside the terminological 
refinement, the upshot is that extrinsicness in this special global sense can-
not question the reality of such property attributions since without these 
framework conditions no thing is available to us as object of knowledge.
As to the temporal case, F. Jackson has already dismissed Lewis’s 
quest for “real temporary intrinsics”, i.e. “real” in the sense of not requir-
ing reference to times. Jackson has pointed out that the contingent intrin-
sic properties are precisely those that apply to things at certain times and 
there is no further genuine intrinsicness on the top of this.10 The temporal 
constraint does not expel them from the class of real properties.
10 See Jackson (1994).
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Extrinsic properties inherit much of the traditional bias against rela-
tions since they are often identified as relational properties.11 Aristotle 
said that relations are “the least real from all sorts of entities” since “they 
require many things” (the relata) for them to apply (Metaphysics, 1088a). 
Leibniz also took relations only “entia rationis” belonging to the realm of 
ideas. Leibniz distinguished the “extrinsic denominations” of individuals 
from “intrinsic” ones: the former contains reference to another individual 
apart from the one named. And he rightly insisted that there cannot be 
purely extrinsic denominations of the individuals since there must be a 
monadic ground of reference.
The bias against relations is misguided, however, in the present con-
text. Extrinsic properties are not directly relational, as Lewis points out. 
He says that the “intrinsic”/ “extrinsic” division is the result of an “inten-
sional classification” where the structural features of the properties do not 
play a role. By contrast, “relational” applies only to “structured proper-
ties”.12 To illuminate the point, “being a dentist” is an extrinsic property 
since no lonely person in a one-man universe could be a dentist; it has a 
relational kin though, like “x being the dentist of y”. In sum, the relational 
bias cannot work against the reality of extrinsic properties.
Truthmaking is also explored to disputes about the status of the mo-
dal/sortal properties. Here the strategy is to question the modal/sortal 
propositions by pointing out that they lack appropriate candidates for the 
truth-making role. Hence, all the putative truths of propositions of the dis-
puted class would be truths-without-truthmakers which is clearly incoher-
ent. For example, there are no truthmakers to claims about qua objects, i.e. 
objects specified under a given sortal. It is not clear, say, what would make 
it true that a “man” under the sortal “official person” is essentially such 
that he has a certain scope of authority; while under the sortal “person” 
simpliciter he is essentially such that he lacks this property. The lacking 
of truthmakers of modal/sortal propositions undercuts the reality claim of 
modal/sortal properties embedded in such propositions.
One way of evading the truthmaking challenge is to treat modal truths 
as factorizable into an analytic component and an empirical component; 
the former being essential and necessary but also being only about lan-
guage and logic; while the latter being contingent and informative but also, 
being about the world, hence lacking necessity. This position has been 
devised as a due response to Kripke’s putative “necessary a posteriori” 
11 Francescotti takes the relational aspect decisive in the definition of “extrinsic”. See 
Francescotti (1999).
12 See Lewis (2002: 431).
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truths.13 Unfortunately, factorizing as a justificatory strategy is far from 
being helpful in elucidating the constitutive aspect of modal/sortal proper-
ties. Without this aspect, however, one cannot account for these properties’ 
status. Therefore I suggest to turning, instead, to the fine-grained concep-
tion of facts, our familiar propositional truthmakers. This conception is 
more suitable for epistemic and hence, modal purposes than the coarse-
grained conception of facts. As is known from the Frege-Church view, 
facts can be given a fine-grained analysis, by taking them short for facts-
under-certain-modes-of-presentation. The refined analysis with facts-un-
der-certain-modes-of-presentation rather than facts simpliciter arises with 
explaining epistemic contexts where the substitutivity of identicals does 
not in general hold. For example, little Paul may know the fact that he has 
two eyes under the mode of this fact being presented to him as “Paul has 
two eyes”. While he may reject, at the same time, to know the same fact 
under the mode of presentation of “the number of Paul’s eyes is the even 
prime number”, not knowing that 2 is the sole even prime number.14 So, 
the suggestion is to shift from the usual extensional truthmaker, the “fact”, 
to the intensional truthmaker, the “fact-under-certain-modes-of-presenta-
tion”. The fine-grained notion of fact seems to supply us with a truthmaker 
in the case of truth claims involving modal/sortal properties. This is not to 
say that I find the very notion of truthmaking and the available truthmaker 
theories impeccable. I do not even think that conformity to some truth-
making principle is an indispensable metaphysical requirement. All I want 
to say is that truthmaking does not mean an insurmountable difficulty for 
the reality status of modal/sortal properties.
Sortal properties depend on the conceptual framework adopted, as we 
have seen. The dominant reading of Carnap’s position about this matter 
might also create the illusion that these properties are not “real”; i.e. not 
real as features capable of determining the nature of things.15 Typically, 
those who see sheer conventionalism in the conceptualist understanding 
of modal metaphysics, rely on Carnap’s dictum that the adoption of a con-
ceptual framework is a practical, external issue without claim to reality. 
To quote: “to be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the 
system; hence this question cannot be meaningfully applied to the system 
13 Advocates of the position are, among others, Peacocke (1999), Thomasson (2007), 
Sidelle (1989).
14 The fine-grained notion of facts is gaining recognition in the philosophy of mind 
as well. Tim Crane, following Mellor, uses the expression “facta” for the intensional vari-
ant of “fact” in the context of the knowledge argument. See his (2003), in Hungarian, 
especially 114–115.
15 Obviously, Platonic realism about abstract entities, including properties, is not rel-
evant to the present issue.
63M. UJVÁRI: Intrinsic, hence Real; Extrinsic, hence Unreal?
itself”.16 The message is clear, I think: there is no unrelativized sense of 
being “real”, without the presupposition of some framework system. Any 
meaningful question about the reality of items of some sort applies only 
against the background of a system. This is Carnap’s position with regard 
to ontology. As a consequence, question about reality does not apply to the 
framework system itself: the “alleged statement of reality of the system of 
entities is a pseudo-statement without cognitive content”.17
In his critical analysis of Carnap, Soames extends this position about 
ontology to the enterprise of explanation. From the emphatic denial of the 
reality of the ontological question, repeated by Carnap, Soames concludes 
that “from here it is a short step to the conclusion that the cognitive con-
tents of empirically equivalent theories couched in the two languages are 
the same … [hence] the choice between the two theories is purely prag-
matic, not cognitive in nature”.18
I think that the sense in which the choice of a framework is non-cog-
nitive is different from the sense in which the choice between empirically 
equivalent theories is. The latter claim is obviously the formulation of the 
classical verificationist position: one can assess theories by their verifiable 
empirical consequences and if they share the same consequences, in vir-
tue of sharing the same cognitive content, then the choice between them 
has no cognitive import. This verificationist point is different from the 
ontological point about the non-cognitive character of ontological ques-
tions formulated without the antecedent specification of some framework. 
By overlooking this difference, one would hastily conclude with Soames, 
then, that whatever is practical or pragmatic with Carnap, is “not cognitive 
in nature”.
But this is a hasty conclusion. Although framework systems are not 
“theories” in an outright form, they are nevertheless theoretically loaded, 
so that the adoption of conceptual frameworks with sortal concepts and 
modal persistence conditions is a cognitive issue. Not the least because 
it is a precondition for empirical theories with cognitive content that a 
framework be adopted in which those theories could be formulated. So, 
what paves the step from ontology to explanation is not their shared 
non-cognitive nature, let alone the fact that “non-cognitive” equivocates 
between two senses as I have shown. As is familiar, Carnap takes the “in-
ternal” issues, i.e. issues formulated within a framework to be the analytic 
consequences of the adopted framework. This comes with his “ambitious 
concept of ‘analyticity’”, as Soames has put it. However, I am inclined to 
16 See Carnap (1956: 207). 
17 Carnap (1956: 214).
18 Soames (2009: 431).
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take the “ambitious concept of analyticity” as an understatement for the 
constitutive role of the adopted framework.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to say that the framework principles 
do have cognitive consequences, precisely because they are partly consti-
tutive of kinds, sortals. Different framework principles yield different sets 
of truths about things identified as tokens of the adopted kinds, sortals. So, 
sortal properties are real, in the sense of being constitutive of kinds and 
the same applies to modal properties specifying the persistence conditions 
for tokens of these kinds. Sortal/modal truths about things have cognitive 
consequences.
Nothing validates, therefore the shallow reading of conceptualism 
sounding something like this: “the choice of framework is a matter of 
convention hence it is not cognitive in nature”. This is an illegitimate com-
bination of parts from two different Carnapian dicta, the one about ontol-
ogy, the other about explanation. It is illegitimate, because the choice of 
a framework being pragmatic does not tell against its principles’ having a 
cognitive import.
To conclude: we do not have to seek a dilemma there, where there 
is none. It is not the case that modal/sortal properties are “unreal” and 
“extrinsic”, so they do not contribute to determining the nature of things. 
To the contrary, they are both real and extrinsic. “Real”, because their 
attributions have cognitive consequences; they create the joints nature is 
to be cut at. “Extrinsic”, because they refer, tacitly though, to framework 
principles. The solution I recommend here to solve the false dilemma is 
based on closing the gap between the metaphysical and the epistemologi-
cal perspectives.
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